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Introduction
Problematic and divisive content dominates today’s online platforms. Disinformation, abuse,
conspiracy theories, and hate speech have risen to prominence and created challenges both
online and o . Policymakers, advocates, journalists, and academics have all called on
platforms to ensure that this content doesn’t overtake more bene cial uses of their services.
Many proposed solutions focus on platforms’ ability to directly allow or prohibit particular
types of speech or users and ask the platforms to do more to remove speci c instances of
abusive speech.
These proposals raise serious questions about the role a private corporation should play in
determining the limits of acceptable speech. Because private companies—such as social
media platforms—are not subject to First Amendment restrictions, they alone are able to
determine what content is permissible in the public sphere with little restriction, and that
dynamic may potentially erode or obviate many of the protections granted under the First
Amendment. On the other hand, government regulation or oversight of moderation raises
signi cant questions about whether such restrictions would be permissible under the First
Amendment as it is currently understood.
It is our intuition that, rather than focus on particular speakers or speech, policymakers
should instead address the underlying platform business practices that encourage much of
the most harmful speech. Any long-term solution must address the ways in which platforms
collect data and curate content in order to maximally harvest users’ attention and sell
advertisements, the main method of monetization online.
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Speci cally, online platforms curate and promote content to drive user engagement (the
intensity and frequency with which a user interacts with a platform), which in turn enables
platforms to collect more detailed information about the types of content users engage with.
This data collection provides platforms with insights not just into the type of content that
provokes users to engage generally, but also into the preferences, interests, and likely
behaviors of speci c users—insights that then can be used to personalize and deliver the
content that is most engaging to each user. Since by de nition, the more provocative the
content, the more likely it is to garner and retain attention,  platforms are economically
incentivized to permit and even to encourage the spread of extreme or controversial harmful
speech, as it is likely to directly bene t them  nancially. In a targeted advertising model,
misinformation and conspiracy theories are o en the product, not an accident.
Addressing targeted advertising as a business practice, rather than speci c types of speech
and speakers, avoids many of the thorniest First Amendment issues.  Removing or lessening
platforms’  nancial incentives to promote bad content to their users dampens questions
about the prudence of a private company acting as a de facto censor on public speech and
removes concerns over the limits of government commandeering of platforms. At the same
time, placing meaningful restrictions on targeted advertising practices addresses many of
the structural supports for the wide reach of fake news and harassment.
This paper will explore a framework for regulating platforms without mandating content-
based restrictions. To do so, it will explain that the platforms have the technical means to
provide curated spaces. The analysis will then show why an ex post content-based
moderation system cannot solve the root problems faced by platforms. It will then examine
the incentive structure created by the targeted advertising model and show that addressing
those incentives would likely reduce the spread of harmful content on many platforms
without running afoul of the First Amendment.
Platform Moderation Will Always Be
Imperfect
The primary solution proposed to platforms is simply to remove more speech and speakers.
Platforms have responded to these proposals and have shown some willingness to ban
problematic or fake users outright, build algorithms to detect hate speech and fake news,
promote “trusted” news sources and demote others, and employ human moderators.
Despite some positive indications, these tools raise signi cant civil rights and First
Amendment concerns on their own—detailed below—and do not always work.  Additionally,
the platforms have demonstrated that moderation and content removal is o en driven by
public opinion, rather than established practices, and has not been consistently applied.
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Many of the current platform moderation approaches can be seen as extensions of early anti-
spam techniques developed by email service providers. In the 1990s, email provided a new
means to communicate instantly with the world. Naturally, solicitation, fraud, and abuse
followed closely behind.  Email providers were forced to grapple with unwanted speech and
develop technical tools to reduce unwanted messages.  As platforms faced similar problems,
they turned toward existing techniques to sanitize their services.  Platform moderation
therefore looks very similar to email spam control: Senders who might have been
“blacklisted” on email servers are essentially users banned on platforms. Whitelisted users
are now “veri ed,” and whitelisted domains are “trusted sources.” Email content  ltering
has evolved into a complex web of platform policies,  ltering techniques, and machine-
learning tools.
While both email providers and social media platforms must regulate huge volumes of
speech and content, the challenges they face are considerably di erent, and email-based
moderation tools have not risen to the challenge. Unlike email anti-spam techniques, which
largely a ected private communications, platform moderation plays out in the public eye
and directly a ects the ability of individuals and entities to speak in public forums, and
platform policies shape the degree of protection individual speakers may enjoy.
Blacklisting and Whitelisting
Banning individual users and domains—blacklisting—was one of the  rst techniques
adopted to counter spam.  Early email users simply began keeping lists of IP addresses
that sent fraudulent emails and prevented those addresses from being able to transfer
outgoing emails.  This practice, slightly modi ed, remains a crucial part of platform content
moderation: Platforms routinely identify speakers that contravene policies and ban those
accounts.  Twitter alone removed over 70 million accounts over the course of two months in
2018;  Facebook removed 583 million—a quarter of its user base—in the  rst three months of
the same year.
Despite high visibility, this practice has not kept pace with the actual challenges posed by
harmful speech on the platforms. For a variety of reasons, platforms have not taken action
against many of the most egregious accounts or have only done so a er severe public
pressure. Many of the accounts identi ed with promoting “fake news” during the 2016 U.S.
presidential election remain online.  Banning accounts is also  nancially disincentivized
for platforms, since user growth and engagement are central to their business models: Daily
and monthly active users are the primary metrics by which a service’s growth is measured.
Further, accounts are only banned a er they have violated a policy—by posting hate speech
or advocating violence, for instance. Blacklisting alone is not an e ective solution to prevent
harmful speech.
Blacklisting also requires platforms to be able to identify users, even pseudonymously,
which a ects the right to speak anonymously and to associate freely. Additionally, to enable
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information—such as their IP addresses—to ensure that the speaker does not simply create
new accounts and avoid the ban.  Resorting to banning users means that platforms cannot
provide an arena for anonymous or pseudonymous speech, cornerstones of the First
Amendment rights enjoyed by Americans.  Platforms’ central role also makes blacklisting
particularly disruptive. While an email user blacklisted from certain domains was still able
to communicate with other parties, a user blacklisted from a platform has no ability to
continue communications on that platform. Blacklisting therefore not only is largely
ine ective to protect against harmful speech but also erodes constitutionally protected
anonymity of speech at a time when the U.S. government has argued that an individual has
no right to anonymity when posting online.
Whitelisting on platforms faces di erent but complementary challenges. Email whitelisting
protects legitimate bulk emailers by placing them on pre-approved sender lists, enabling
those senders to avoid being  ltered as spam.  Modern platforms largely mimicked this
technique by creating a rmative signals, such as badges and trust-based rankings. One such
program, Facebook’s “trusted news source” program, ranked news sources and prioritized
stories from “trusted news sources,” including major outlets such as the New York Times and
the Wall Street Journal. Stories from trusted sources were placed higher in news feeds,
displacing other content, such as “blogs that may be on more of the fringe”  or spam. These
 lters rely on determinations about the speaker,  rather than the speech itself skirting many
of the main challenges on the platforms. Many mainstream news sources and speakers, for
instance, promote content that could be considered hateful or misinformation, and
promoting those voices absent determinations on their content risks simply lending
legitimacy to fringe ideas without addressing other structural issues on platforms.
Platforms also whitelist users in the form of “veri ed” badges. Like “trusted news sources,”
veri ed badges are based on the identity of an individual, rather than any speci c speech.
While Twitter views veri ed badges as a simple indication that a particular account is
authentic,  users may well believe that the checkmark indicates a level of veracity or trust
in a veri ed account.  Even more than trusted news, this approach can have signi cant
error costs and promote harmful and abusive content under the guise of “veri cation.”
Shock jock Alex Jones, for instance, was veri ed on Twitter before he was banned, as was
aspiring provocateur Jacob Wohl.  Whitelisting also removes any right to anonymity an
individual might have had, since platforms generally will not verify pseudonymous or
anonymous accounts.
Both blacklisting and whitelisting on platforms create signi cant limitations on the rights of
speakers without meaningfully addressing the promulgation and spread of the most harmful
types of speech online. Relying on or enhancing these methods is unlikely to lead to
sustainable or desirable solutions. Increasing blacklisting, for instance, will not curb
harmful speech, as banning occurs only a er bad actions. At the same time, an e ective
banning policy will require platforms to invade the privacy rights of their users and collect
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speakers, rather than speech, means that divisive or fringe speakers can still promote their
theories, only now with an air of legitimacy granted by recognition from the platforms. At
the same time, anonymous speech is disadvantaged, since platforms will not verify
anonymous accounts and the platform has inserted itself as a gatekeeper to legitimate
speech.
Blacklisting also creates immense potential for abuse, and companies have overstepped
boundaries in the past. For instance, the Spamhaus Project, an international email
reputation service widely used by businesses to  lter email, has been accused of abusing its
position by blacklisting companies without due process or based on personal animosity.
Though Spamhaus, like major social media platforms, protests that it operates “within the
boundaries of the law” and remains “accountable to [its] users,”  others have alleged that
the company uses its powerful position to force other companies to refuse to deal with
individuals Spamhaus has decided should be blocked.  By virtue of its power to make
blacklisting decisions, Spamhaus, a private company, exerts enormous judicial pressure and
extra-judicial in uence over the business operations of other enterprises with little to no
accountability. As platforms continue to consolidate power over online speech, there is
signi cant risk that similar abuses might occur.
Direct Content Filtering
Platforms have also adopted content  ltering tools and methods from email providers. Web
providers have  ltered content since nearly the beginning of the web.  Early spam  lters
relied largely on reading the content of an email to look for keywords or to “score” the
message in order to determine whether it was legitimate.  For both email and platforms,
 ltering is central to the product.  Without it, there would simply be too much information
for consumers to absorb.
Despite the necessity of the practice,  ltering creates the most direct potential First
Amendment issues. As private actors, platforms can legally remove any content they like.
With no external checks, First Amendment protections mean very little, since private
companies, not the government, are the bottlenecks to speech. But, if the government were
to enforce  lters and rules about what speech is permitted, moderation actions would run
headlong into existing restrictions on policing speech. Either way, directly moderating
content poses serious challenges.
The First Amendment protects only against actions taken by the government. In practice,
this means that platforms have wide latitude to set their own policies on what content is and
is not acceptable. Platforms do not have to guarantee any procedural rights for users before
removing content, nor are platforms subject to formal outside scrutiny of their policies or
decision making. Recent strides toward transparency and accountability are encouraging
but fall short in that they are not meaningful substitutes for safeguards and checks and
balances for users.  Indeed, many platform users have been unsuccessful when challenging
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remove actual hate speech and disinformation.  In response, platforms have proposed new
methods for accountability, mimicking existing democratic structures, such as Facebook’s
proposed “Supreme Court.”  Unless checked, platforms’ nearly limitless power to shape and
suppress online speech has the potential to completely swallow large portions of First
Amendment protections against the government.
Checking platform moderation power is not a simple proposition. Involving the government
in censorship or moderation activities runs headlong into the most salient First Amendment
issues. Under current law, the government cannot force a private company to withhold or to
publish particular content.  More recent cases suggest that the government may not be able
to directly prohibit “fake news” or other false speech simply because it is untrue.  The
complexity of involving the government in platform moderation may be enough to dissuade
policymakers from pursuing that course of action. However, if the government does become
involved, platforms are likely to bow to governmental pressure in the United States as they
have done in other countries where governments have insisted on content concessions.  To
be sure, the U.S. government has already eroded some legislative speech protections for
platforms by e ectively insisting that platforms take particular moderation actions against
certain types of content.
Overall, direct moderation of content and users creates enormous potential for collision with
or usurpation of the protections of the First Amendment. At the same time, it is not even
clear that these moderation tools are e ective at protecting users and removing illicit
content.  Direct content moderation is likely an insu cient response to address the speech
problems faced by platforms and platform users. The next section will examine how
regulating advertising practices online could alleviate many of the most serious challenges
online and provide a framework for addressing harmful speech moving forward.
Targeted Advertising Encourages Platforms
to Prioritize Controversial Content
Direct moderation of content will likely always fail to achieve the stated goals of the
platforms because the business models of the platforms themselves encourage and reward
divisive or controversial content. Today, nearly every social media platform makes money
selling advertisements, rather than charging individual users.  Ad-based platforms auction
o  users’ attention to advertisers and provide the most ad content to users when users spend
the most time on the platform.  Platforms are therefore incentivized to serve the content
that is most engaging and likely to provoke a response, whether that be a share, a like, or a
purchase.  Time and again, the best fodder for such a response has proved to be incendiary,
controversial, and divisive material.  For instance, users may share “fake news” even
though they know it is factually incorrect when that content rea rms a user’s sense of
identity or culture.  Platforms themselves may also share or promote controversial content
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discrepancy was made clearer when Facebook changed its content sorting to promote direct
content from a user’s individual friends over other content. A er platform engagement
dropped signi cantly,  the company reversed the move. Platforms therefore have signi cant
interest in promoting harmful content in order to keep users engaged as long as possible.
Once a user is engaged, platforms amass enormous amounts of information to target
advertisements directly toward what a platform knows a user will respond to. Platforms
collect information including social interactions, demographics, what a user clicks and
doesn’t click, and myriad other data points to build a digital dossier on each user.  They
know about users’ personality types, behavioral quirks, and even emotional states.
Platforms know exactly what pushes a user’s buttons and how to engage that individual.
Platforms then monetize the users by allowing advertisers to engage directly with speci c
populations. Recent controversies have highlighted the mismatch between business
practices and  ltering principles: Until recently, Facebook permitted advertisers to use the
category “jew haters” as a target for advertisements. It also distributed anti-vaccination
advertisements to potential young mothers.  Advertisements in this context are not simply a
means to sell a product but act to directly shape user behavior o -platform.  Unscrupulous
advertising practices and content delivery don’t just create a harmful platform: They also
contribute to o -platform behavior, such as Pizzagate and racial discrimination,  and
provide harmful advertisers an enormous platform to reach vulnerable populations.
While platforms have paid lip service to reforming content moderation, they have largely
avoided making any such commitments with regard to advertising practices.  Instead,
platforms have doubled down on growth and pro ts and insisted that additional
accountability measures, such as transparency and changes to internal governance, are
su cient to redress content issues online.  This is simply not the case. So long as platform
pro ts are reliant on keeping users on-platform as long as possible, controversial and
harmful speech will continue to proliferate.
Despite the ubiquity of the targeted advertising, there is growing skepticism that the practice
creates more value for anyone outside of the companies providing the targeting. Researchers
have found that “behaviourally targeted advertising had increased the publisher’s revenue
but only marginally” while costing “orders of magnitude” more to deliver.  Major platforms
have misled brands and advertisers about the value of placing ads.  Recently, several large
brands have scaled back or stopped the practice altogether. Procter & Gamble reduced its
targeted-ad budget in 2018 a er it determined that the program was a waste of money.
Following the enactment of the European General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR),
Google is supporting non-targeted ads in Europe,  and the New York Times stopped
behavioral advertising altogether while raising its overall advertising revenue in the same
period.  The past several years have seen a reckoning with targeted advertising from within
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Regulating Advertising Practices Reduces
Constitutional Friction
This essay began by outlining the reasons that speech- and user-focused platform
moderation are unlikely to be successful long-term solutions and why the practices create
maximal challenges to the First Amendment as it is currently understood. It then discussed
why platform business practices create incentives and opportunities for platforms to accept
and promote controversial content online. The essay will now outline several proposals for
addressing the mismatch between platform and public incentives and explain how each
approach might stem the  ow of unwanted content online.
Congress should restrict platform practices as part of any
privacy legislation.
Following a scad of high-pro le platform scandals, Congress is considering a number of
proposals to increase privacy and data security for U.S. consumers. Despite mounting
evidence that platform structure incentivizes privacy-invasive practices,  legislators have
largely ignored that relationship in public text. While the relationship between privacy and
targeted ads is distinct from questions of platform moderation, the two are closely related.
Just as targeted ads incentivize platforms to serve divisive content, so too does the model
incentivize platforms to gather as much personal information as possible on users without
regard for its provenance or future use.  Congress and state legislatures should ensure that
privacy laws meaningfully address the advertising models of platforms and place restrictions
on how data can be collected and used for advertising purposes.
Existing law provides guidance for how Congress might structure such restrictions. For
example, the GDPR places restrictions on what data companies may acquire, and once
collected, how those companies may use the data.  Congress could address some of the
most egregious platform behavior by ensuring that, for instance, certain types of
information are not collected by platforms and, when data is collected, that not all data can
be used for advertising or commercial purposes.  Additionally, restrictions could be placed
on using information collected in one context from being used in a di erent context—for
example, prohibiting using phone numbers collected for account recovery from being used
for cross-platform advertising purposes.  The devil is in the details, of course, but focusing
on business behavior rather than consumer harms provides a strong basis for addressing
platform harms generally and would lessen the need for aggressive moderation.
The California Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) also provides a starting point for regulators.
While many of the harms from divisive speech begin with platforms promoting divisive
content to engage users, others result from sharing consumer data with third parties. The
CCPA addresses this type of harm by restricting the types of data that platforms and other
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parties once they have received that information.  This should, in turn, reduce the ability
for third parties to amass detailed pro les about individuals across multiple sites, services,
and devices and signi cantly constrain the ability to in uence those users.
The Federal Trade Commission has authority to address
advertising practices.
Congress may or may not decide to approach platform advertising head-on. Until they do, or
if they do not, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) likely has existing authority to curtail the
targeted advertising practices. Under Section 5 of the FTC Act,  the Commission may enjoin
“unfair or deceptive” practices. While claims under the so-called “deceptive authority” are
more common,  the Commission here may well be able to exercise its authority to ban unfair
practices.
In an unfairness case, the FTC must show that (1) the injury to consumers is substantial, (2)
any injury is not outweighed by other bene ts, and (3) the injury is not reasonably avoidable
by consumers.  As explained above, targeted advertising has the potential to create
substantial injury both to individual consumers and to society.  Individual consumers may
also  nd themselves excluded from seeing certain ads based on protected categories.  While
societal harms are more di use, they are evident through e ects such as  lter bubbles,
radicalization,  and other o -platform activities.  These negative e ects, though di use,
provide ample evidence that platform business activities may not provide much of their
promised bene t to consumers. Against direct and di use harms, there is a growing
consensus that targeted advertising may not provide  nancial bene t to anyone other than
the ad-tech companies.  Researchers have shown that behavioral advertising likely only
creates nominal value compared to contextual or direct advertising and costs signi cantly
more to produce and deliver.  A recent empirical study showed that targeted advertisements
are, on average, only worth $0.00008 (4%) more than non-targeted ads to the publishers of
the advertisements.  The risk of data breach or the  to platforms and users is signi cant, as
websites serving targeted advertisements must create, maintain, and store enormous
datasets on millions of users.  There is a limit to what type of targeted advertising users will
even tolerate,  and any purported bene t to consumers is likely outweighed by the harm
su ered individually and in the aggregate. Lastly, consumers o en have no way to avoid
harm other than by not using platforms or playing a cat-and-mouse game with online ad
blockers. While this is feasible for some, it is not a realistic option in many cases.
Platforms themselves do not even have the capability to reduce the potential for harm once
consumer information is in the wild.
Depending on the explicit or implicit representations made by platforms to their users, the
Commission may also be able to pursue action based on its deceptive practices authority. For
example, if the Commission determined that a platform held itself out as a neutral arbiter of
discourse but was instead actively promoting certain viewpoints over others, that
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enforcement in other situations when advertisers misrepresented the origins and nature of
advertisements to consumers.
While additional facts may be necessary to fully support an enforcement action, the
Commission certainly has the tools and authorities to explore whether it can bring an action
under the unfairness authority. It should do so.
Platforms may face liability despite the Communications
Decency Act.
Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA 230)  protects online service
providers from being liable for content posted by their users.  Under the Act, providers are
not treated as the “publishers” of users’ speech and therefore are not responsible for its
content.  This protection applies even when providers restrict access to material, even if
that material is constitutionally protected.  This provision has o en been held out as a form
of absolute immunity for social media platforms and other providers for the information on
their platforms.
However, Section 230 may not extend as broadly as some claim. Notably, while CDA 230
protects platforms from liability for content published by third parties content hosted by the
platform, those protections may not extend to platforms for decisions about business
practices and other non-content activities if the practices are not explicitly a publication
activity by the platform or a third party.  For instance, platforms may be liable for enabling
discrimination or other illegal practices by providing certain ad categories to third parties,
since creating and monetizing the categories is not a publication activity.  Similarly, legal
commenters have noted that Section 230 is accorded a much more sweeping e ect than its
plain language alone might support.  While platforms most likely cannot be held
accountable for speci c instances of hate speech or harassment,  they may well face
liability for non-speech business practices that enable and encourage malicious or illegal
content.
In addition to current liability for non-publication business practices, we should consider
whether platforms should face liability for content when the platform has substantially
transformed the presentation beyond the contents’ original form or context. Platforms do not
simply pass along user content—they take an active role in how, when, and where that
content is displayed (including selectively not displaying new content or promoting older
content repeatedly). To do this, platforms use information about individuals in combination
with aggregate information about group behavior (so-called “big data”) as well as inferences
made about a particular user’s behavior (personalized content). They use that information to
create insights about likely responses and engagement to particular material and then curate
the universe of user-generated content to maximize engagement independent of the original
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The platform editorial process does not simply present users with posts created by their
friends or connections: It substantially modi es the order, context, and meaning of user
content. Platforms are aware of this transformative e ect and have acknowledged that their
role is more akin to a “media company” than just a tech platform.  Twitter has considered
surrounding “fake news” with posts debunking false assertions, an acknowledgment that
context and position change meaning. Platforms ought not be held liable for every piece of
harmful or malicious content generated by their users, but we should seriously consider
whether their content curation functions should fall outside the protective embrace of
Section 230.
Conclusion
The proposals outlined above are intended to show that many of the challenges posed by
speech on platforms—and platforms’ responses— may be partially be addressed by legal and
regulatory tools that encroach less immediately on the First Amendment. The authors
believe that existing constitutional protections likely remain su cient to address new types
and controllers of speech online. However, before addressing whether speech online must be
further curtailed, or grappling with thorny questions of which entities are best able to make
content determinations, it is  rst necessary to challenge structural practices that encourage
harmful speech.
To this end, the authors have suggested taking concrete steps to better align private and
public interests. By focusing on platform practices, we have suggested that many of the
incentives for promoting harmful speech can be removed and platforms’ priorities more
closely aligned with those of the public. That realignment may serve to reduce or obviate
many of the most challenging questions thrust into sharp relief by the proliferation of
speech online. These solutions are neither complete nor perfect. But they represent actions
necessary to understand the types and degree of harms and challenges that do truly exist
and provide a framework to grapple with larger questions about the role of platforms in
enabling and policing public speech.
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